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TED SHAPIRO: Welcome, everyone. Welcome to the EU 1 Copyright
Reform Session. I hope you are all well. I miss you all. It’s been said a million
times, but I obviously wish we were all sitting in the Big Apple right now. Today,
we have an impressive array of expert speakers and panelists from across the
European Union, both in terms of nationalities and countries, as well as someone
from Down Under.
We will peel back the layers of recent European copyright reform and
consider a number of different themes ranging from member state implementation
of the DSM Copyright Directive,2 and the Commission’s efforts to rewrite it; the
potential impact of pending jurisprudence from the Court of Justice; new exceptions
and limitations; the scourge of extended collective licensing; the new press
publishers’ related right, with some comparisons to Australia and earlier attempts
in Germany and in Spain; author and performer remuneration; and Article 17, 3 the
value gap.
One of the general comments that was already made by the speakers, and
it’s obviously appropriate for this conference, is what can other jurisdictions learn
about the EU experience and debate. When you think about that, one of the things
that you do need to think about, when looking at EU-level legislation, is keeping in
mind that there is the internal market factor that is also a driving force in EU-level
legislation. Recent EU copyright legislation is in particular marked by a tendency,
and we heard Marco alluding to this in his presentation earlier today, towards bans
on contractual freedom; interference in contractual relations between parties that
would normally bargain at arm’s length; an erosion of the territoriality of copyright;
redefining and narrowing of exceptions or creating new exceptions; more powerful
exceptions and limitations; and, weaker protection of technological measures.
Another thing to bear in mind, and maybe we’ll get to this at the end if
there’s time for discussion, is also what’s on the future horizon. Hopefully not too
much more EU copyright reform in the near term, but of course, we have a pending
review of the collective rights management directive; a never-ending pipeline of
cases before the Court of Justice; more talk about territoriality; the Digital Services
Act,4 where clearly copyright law is lex specialis, but maybe more clarity may be
needed. Of course, some aspects will apply to services that are not covered by the
DSM, and perhaps there’s some complementarity there as well. Then, of course,
the ever-popular artificial intelligence and discussions around copyright
infrastructure.
I think that’s enough by way of introduction. Our first speaker is Eleonora
Rosati, who is now at Stockholm University, I believe. I don’t know if she’s
actually sitting in Stockholm. I’m guessing Jerker is. You also know her as one of
the IPKat persons. She is going to give a first presentation, in particular about the
Digital Single Market Directive. Eleonora, the floor is yours.

1

European Union.
Council Directive 2019/790, 2019 O.J. (L 130) (EC).
3
Council Directive 2019/790, art. 17, 2019 O.J. (L 130) (EC).
4
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single
Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act), COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
2

2

ELEONORA ROSATI: Thank you very much. I hope you can hear me fine
because I had some problems with the microphone before. It’s always a great honor
and pleasure to be part of the Fordham IP Conference. In the time at my disposal,
indeed as Ted was mentioning, I will try to make the point as to where we are with
the transposition of the Digital Single Market Directive. To this end, I’ve prepared
a few slides.
With respect to where we are right now and where we are going, the short
answer to the final point is that we’re not going towards an age in which things
would be easier than what they’ve been over the past few years. But let’s start from
the beginning, where we come from. Here, you see a timeline of events that I’ve
prepared, some of them directly concerning the DSM Directive, others not directly
relating to the Directive, which shows how complex this ecosystem in which the
Directive finds itself is.
Just to go back to the beginning of this story: a formal understanding that
copyright reform was in the air. It dates back to 2015 when the former European
Commission unveiled its Digital Single Market strategy. It was submitted at that
time that the copyright framework was unfit for purpose, it was not modern enough,
and that there were barriers to this Digital Single Market, which I referred to earlier
on. A year later, the proposal for a Directive saw the light. This was a period
characterized by intense and intensive debates and discussions, controversies
regarding the contents of the Directive.
In the end, the text that was adopted is a text of compromise. You see that
the final text of the Directive is much longer than the original proposal. It is also
much more complex, and in some cases, it is difficult to make sense of what the
actual content of certain provisions is. Nonetheless, this compromise text was
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in April 2019. In all this,
shortly after the adoption of the Directive, the Republic of Poland lodged a
complaint with the Court of Justice of European Union, claiming that Article 17,
one of the most discussed provisions, the one concerning online content sharing
service providers, would be contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and
particularly to the right of freedom of expression. 5
Let’s go back to where we are now, April 2021. In a few days’ time, on the
22nd of April, the Advocate General appointed in this case will deliver his opinion
on this matter and it is expected that the CJEU6 judgment will follow in late 2021,
earlier 2022. The Directive after the adoption by these institutions was published in
the official journal and then put into force in June 2019. This moment signaled the
beginning of the ticking clock for the national transpositions indeed. The member
states have time until the 7th of June of this year to transpose the Directive into
their own laws. I will explain in a moment where we are on national transpositions.
After the publication of the Directive in the Official Journal, the ball got
back into the court of the European Commission, which is tasked by Article 17
itself with organization of stakeholder dialogue concerning the application of this
provision. Indeed, there was a series of meetings that took place between late 2019
and early 2020. They were cut short by the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic.
5
6

Case C-401/19, Poland v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2021:613.
Court of Justice of the European Union.

3

What happened next was that the Commission launched a public consultation last
summer, providing a preliminary view of its understanding of the correct
application of Article 17.
The guidance of the European Commission is yet to be unveiled. We learned
earlier today that the publication of Article 17 guidelines is due very soon, but we
don’t know when “very soon” will actually be. Perhaps sometime this month but
might be also later than that. In all these, we’ve also had other macro events that
have had an impact on the Directive itself. For instance, we now know what Brexit
means. The United Kingdom decided not to transpose the Directive. Then, of
course, the COVID-19 pandemic has meant that a delay in the discussion of EU
copyright and national copyright reforms was, indeed, something due to happen.
Other things that matter for the Directive besides this Polish challenge to
the legality of Article 17 is, of course, the pending YouTube/Uploaded referral.
This is a case that was, of course, not referred to under the DSM Directive. It is a
case concerning, among other things, the InfoSoc Directive. 7 It is mostly about the
question whether platforms like YouTube and cyberlocker Uploaded communicate
to the public. What is important from the perspective of DSM Directive is the fact
that the interplay between the InfoSoc and the DSM Directive featured prominently
during the hearing before the Court of Justice and was also a significant part of the
Advocate General opinion in this case.
According to the Advocate General, the DSM Directive’s right of
communication to the public will not be a clarification of the law as it preexisted
the adoption of the Directive, but will be a novel regime which, of course, has a
significant impact. Also, it will address what freedoms member states do enjoy
when it comes to the national transposition of the Directive. This is something that
has been brought to light by the German discussion around the transposition of the
Directive.
For the time being, there is no date set yet for the release of the judgment.
Nothing is scheduled, at least until the 6th of May. As you can see, our timeline of
events is rather complex. The complexity of the Directive is only one piece of the
puzzle. There are many other things that have a direct or indirect impact on the
transposition, and understanding, and interpretation of the Directive.
This brings me where we are at the moment. This is a table that I have taken
from the Communia website which gives an understanding of where we are with
these national transpositions. As you can see, so far, only the Netherlands has
proceeded to fully implement the Directive. This reform was passed in late 2020
and is due to enter into force in a couple of months.
What we have added, in addition to this, is partial transpositions of the
Directive. This has been the case in France and Hungary. What we are seeing with
the French case is that the discussion around the DSM Directive is anything but
over. France has transposed the press publishers’ right, and immediately after the
adoption of this provision, there was a dispute between Google and a representative
organization of the French press concerning the refusal by the former to indeed pay
the fee for license of use of press publications.
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This is a dispute that, in the end, was solved not through the intervention of
courts and tribunals, but rather the French competition authority. This
understanding is that, indeed, this is going to be a very litigious season in which
issues will arise not only from a copyright standpoint, but also from the point of
view of competition law.
Coming to the end of this short overview, where are we going? In other
words, are things ever going to become easier? The answer is no. The DSM
Directive is a very ambitious harmonization attempt on the side of EU legislature,
and what is ambitious about it is also the multifaceted rationale that supports EU
intervention. The DSM Directive is not just an internal market instrument. It is an
instrument to bring fairness in the copyright marketplace. This is something that
we see in relation to the online platforms approach in Article 17, that we see in the
press publishers’ right, and that we see in authors and performers’ contracts. It's
also a Directive that seeks to make Europe competitive vis-à-vis their countries,
and this is quite apparent when we look at the text and data mining exceptions.
Then, of course, there are elements about bringing European cultural
heritage to the fore; make it usable, visible. This is what we see in relation to outof-commerce works and the possibility of member states to introduce licenses with
extended effect. In a nutshell, it is an ambitious piece of legislation, but it is also a
very complex one. The prehistory of the Directive shows how controversial the
very content of several provisions was perceived to be.
The post-natal life of the Directive is going to be equally or even more
complex. We are already seeing questions of interpretation regarding the nature of
the right of communication to the public in Article 17, regarding the waivability of
the press publishers’ right in Article 15. What has happened in France is just a
preview of what is going to happen also in other member states.
For the years to come, first of all, we need to see our member states
transpose the Directive. This is something that is yet to be finalized and is largely
to occur, I think, for many member states well into ‘22, if not beyond that. Then
there will of course be litigation before national courts and almost unavoidable
referrals to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
On a final note, what we are seeing being discussed in Europe is something
that, of course, is not limited to the European experience. Just three examples of
this. First one, what we have seen in Australia for press publishers is something that
reflected concerns similar to those voiced by European press publishers. Second
example, Singapore is currently considering legislation in relation to text and data
mining. Third example, last summer, the Section 512 study of the U.S. Copyright
Office looked with interest at the European discussion around Article 17. 8 In
conclusion, this DSM Directive is a gift that keeps on giving. We will be
accompanied by discussions about what it means and what kind of obligations it
sets for years to come, a bit like the InfoSoc Directive, which has been with us now
for 20 years. Thank you very much.
8
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TED SHAPIRO: Thank you, Eleonora. You referred, of course, to the swirl
of conflict and complexity in particular around Article 17 of the Directive, the fight
over the Commission’s guidance, and of course the two pending cases before the
Court of Justice. On top of that, of course, we have member state implementation.
That is proving to be, of course, just a transfer of the controversy and conflict if you
look at just the difference between France and Germany.
In that respect, I would like to ask Silke to comment on how that is going in
Germany. My understanding is that the German government is confused and is
implementing a protocol statement that they made at the time of the adoption of the
DSM Copyright Directive, rather than the Directive itself. Could you perhaps
explain where that confusion is coming from?
SILKE VON LEWINSKI: Yes. Thank you, Ted, and hello to everybody.
When the Directive was adopted, the German government made a certain
declaration for the protocol stating that when implementing the Directive, it wanted
to avoid as far as possible any over-blocking, and in particular the use of so-called
upload filters, which are not even mentioned in the Directive, but which have been
a buzzword in the lobbying period during the Directive’s discussion in Germany.
As you may know, we have had many demonstrations in the streets, often
of kids who were mainly pushed by social media, which told them that with Article
17, the internet would be dead and users’ possibilities to express themselves on
platforms would be very limited, also due to over-blocking. There was a big
pressure on politicians to react, and that’s what they did by this declaration, which,
however, is a unilateral declaration and of course does not modify the Directive,
and in any case does not allow any member state, or Germany especially, to go
beyond what is permitted or prescribed by the Directive.
In some respects, it is at least doubtful whether the proposal on the table
fulfills the conditions of Article 17 as laid down in the Directive. Notably, a first
discussion draft was issued last year even in English, which shows that the
government probably wanted to have it spread also to inspire other member states
for their implementation. It is quite inventive. As opposed to the French approach,
which more or less literally transposes Article 17, it has created a whole new draft
act outside of the Copyright Act. It is quite long and very detailed, which may be
good for legal security, especially as regards the complaint and redress procedure.
However, it is also quite complex and there are still some issues that are doubtful.
In particular, there was a lot of criticism because it introduced new
exceptions and limitations not permitted by the Directive or under other EU law.
The argument for doing so arguably without violating EU law was that, as the draft
stated, the right under Article 17 would not be the regular right of communication
to the public as set out in the InfoSoc Directive with its exhaustive list of exceptions,
but it would be a sui generis right of communication to the public for which new
exceptions could be devised. However, this idea seems to me a product of too much
imagination because there is only one communication or making available right
regulated in the InfoSoc Directive, like that under, and in line with, the international
treaties. The DSM Directive did not want to change the communication right, but
just stipulated — and this was the new aspect — that the defined service providers
themselves perform an act of communication to the public when they do what has

6

been described as the activity of an upload platform such as YouTube. The specific
aspect of Article 17 is thus the stipulation of direct or primary rather than secondary
liability of those service providers, but not the communication right itself, so I don’t
see any justification to introduce additional exceptions and limitations.
The criticism on this and other points was so strong that, after all, the
governmental bill — which came out late, after long disputes between the ministry,
which is led by a social democrat politician, and the coalition party of our
government, the Christian Democrats, who had not been involved from the outset
— brought about some changes. Therefore, today these additional exceptions as
such are no longer proposed, but they still re-appear in a slightly changed and
disguised way inside the complaint and redress procedure.
TED SHAPIRO: Thanks, Silke. I think we'll have to come back to it because
we’re out of time for the discussion part of this section. In sum, the proposed
German implementation is still 10 times more complex than Article 17 itself. The
minor tweaks made before the release of the official draft seem to be adding
complexity, but not fixing the problems.
I think that means that we now need to jump to our next presentation, which
is to be done by Jan Nordemann, from the Nordemann Law Firm. There’s about 20
Nordemanns in that firm, based in Berlin. Jan is going to talk about another section
of the DSM Copyright Directive on author and performer remuneration.
JAN NORDEMANN: Thanks, Ted. Great to be on this panel and to talk a
little bit about the new mandatory EU rules on author remuneration in the DSM
Directive. Let’s start with a little overview. Of course, as I’m German, this is to
confirm the old rule that Germans can never start with a joke when they present,
but they always have to start with a table of contents. That’s what I also do here
just to conform to the rule.
There are, what I think, four major provisions in the Copyright Contract
Law Rules of the DSM Directive. This is, first of all, Article 18, as you can see on
the upper left-hand side here, the Principle of Appropriate and Proportionate
Remuneration. Then you have on the right-hand upper side, the Transparency
Obligation About the Use of the Work, Article 19 DSM Directive. I will go into
detail later about this. Then on the lower left-hand side, you see Article 20, the
Contract Adjustment Mechanism for Best Seller Scenarios, at least that would be
my headline for Article 20. Then you have Article 23, the Specific Ban on
Contractual Overrides for Article 19 and Article 20 for the Transparency Obligation
and for the Contract Adjustment for Best Seller Scenarios. Article 23 is what makes
these provisions mandatory, of course.
What is behind this, what did the EU Legislators think, you can see that, in
particular, in Recital 72 of the DSM Directive: authors and performers tend to be
in the weaker contractual position when they grant a license or transfer their rights
for the purpose of exploitation and return for remuneration. The EU Legislators
thought that authors and performers need some protection and need regulation in
Copyright Contract Law in their favor.
Let’s look at the transparency obligation of Article 19, which you see here
as it was put into effect. You have for authors and performers a right to at least once
a year get information on the exploitation of their works and performances, of
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course, from the parties to whom they have licensed or transferred their rights or
their successors in title. This information is in particular regarding modes of
exploitation and all revenues generated. There’s a little limitation stating that you
should take into account the specificities of each sector. As you can already take
from this wording, this will mean a lot of work for producers, publishers and all
who use and exploit copyright-protected works and performances. Some safeguards
apply. According to Article 19, there’s a general proportionality requirement. No
transparency obligation applies if the administrative burden is disproportionate.
Also, no transparency obligation applies if there was no significant contribution by
the author or performer. As you see, you probably have a lot of question marks
already, a lot of issues to discuss.
Let's go into Article 20 and the Contract Adjustment Mechanism for Best
Seller Scenarios. As you can see here from the wording that is on the screen, authors
and performers are entitled to claim additional, appropriate and fair remuneration,
when the remuneration originally agreed turns out to be disproportionately low
compared to all the subsequent relevant revenues derived from the exploitation of
the works or performances. I will translate “disproportionately low” into “best
seller scenario” because usually in case of lump sum payments there’s no longer
proportionality between what the author or performer has got and remuneration and
proceeds the producer or publisher receives. Collective bargaining agreements
prevail. That is important. That’s a push, of course, for collective bargaining
agreements. What is also important, there’s a duty to implement this bestseller
provision into the EU member states’ laws. Every EU member state will have
bestseller provision in the future if all comply with a deadline for June 2021.
The Germans, as Ted mentioned in his introduction, are, regarding the
copyright remuneration rules, a little bit ahead because we know in Germany these
kinds of rules. They were introduced into German law two decades ago already, in
2002. There’s a best seller provision, Article 32a of the German Copyright Act. 9 In
particular, it covers bestseller scenarios if the lump sum remuneration that an author
received or a performer received is combined with a long selling success, then the
remuneration may get out of proportion. There’s extensive practice in Germany
about the best seller provision. There are collective bargaining agreements in place,
several, and there’s also various court litigation in the past and also currently
ongoing, for example, in the film area, by cameramen, screenplay writers or
dubbing artists.
Let me show you one case that is quite famous in Germany, and maybe
you’ve heard about it also outside Germany. That’s the Das Boot case.10 It’s a
bestseller case about a 1981 motion picture which was called Das Boot, or The
Boat. The film follows a World War II German submarine on their Atlantic patrols.
The chief cameraman sued for more money. The chief cameraman is considered
under German law an author. The chief cameraman had received a one-time lump
sum of circa 100,000 Euros in the 1980s. This remuneration was considered fair for
9
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the short-term theatrical, home entertainment and TV use, but because of the long
selling success, it then turned out to be disproportionate, at least that was held by
the German courts, and the German courts held that the cameraman was entitled to
a change of contract and to additional remuneration.
What are the takeaways from the new remuneration rules in Europe? I think
they mean a heavy change of the contractual remuneration between authors and
performers and producers, publishers, etc., in Europe, in particular in those
countries where no such rules exist yet. Implementation, that’s also my guess, will
vary across Europe because some of the rules are rather unclear and leave a lot of
room for implementation. Contractual freedom will be definitely limited, as you
can see already from the bestseller provision. Also, the old Roman law rule pacta
sunt servanda11 may no longer apply. Collective bargaining agreements will take a
more prominent role in Europe. I think that’s for sure as well. There will be
bestseller litigation across EU member states, in all EU member states because it’s
a must-have, the bestseller provision in all EU member states. There are many,
many unresolved legal issues, including, just to name two, international application
of these remuneration rules and the transparency obligation and proportionality, as
I mentioned earlier.
To share some German experiences in Germany, it took 10 to 20 years
before the dust settled on these provisions. That means, of course, these author and
performer remuneration rules are bad news for publishers and producers who will
face additional costs due to transparency and may also face additional payments.
They may be good news for authors and performers, but I think what is definitely
for sure is they’re good news for lawyers because it's an employment program for
lawyers. Thanks. That's all for me for the moment.
TED SHAPIRO: Thank you very much, Jan. A very useful presentation. Of
course, we could spend a whole session just discussing that. It’s clear that the goals
of this legislation are quite important. It’s just the difficulty of when a legislator
intervenes to regulate this kind of thing, how it can work, the compromises that get
made, and of course, the possibility of litigation to fight over how it should work.
You pointed out that given the flexibility in these provisions, we’re going
to have a lot of different approaches in the member states. There are different
safeguards that people can put in place. They are taking into account the flexibilities
of different systems for different sectors. That’s going to mean differences across
the EU. Giuseppe, you have pointed to this legislation, and you’ve raised some
issues.
I was wondering, how do you think that member states will interpret this?
We know that Germany has a fair amount of experience in this area. It has to be
said that, apart from really the UK and Ireland, most member states had most of
these things in various different ways. Of course, they’re now at the EU level. How
will member states interpret these obligations, and will other EU-wide regulations
have an impact on this pursuit of fairness? What do you think?
GIUSEPPE MAZZIOTTI: Thank you, Ted, for your question. Thank you
to the organizers of this conference for having invited me to join this panel, which
I’m enjoying very much.
11
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I think this is just a small piece of legislation if we compare it to the much
bigger picture that is coming out, when it comes to fairness and transparency, on
access to data and transparency rights, as a general rule. It is becoming clear for
those who follow the policymaking process in Brussels, especially the Digital
Services Act or the Digital Markets Act, 12 that Europe has a vision of the largest
exploiters of copyright works that will progressively transform their platforms into
a sort of public service. This concept, at a much bigger scale, contemplates that
platforms provide access to data and, to a certain extent, trade secrets that the whole
computer industry is based upon. It’s not a contradiction, in my view. I think the
power and responsibility that member states have been given under the Copyright
Directive is a consequence of the principle of subsidiarity that the EU law is based
upon.
This idea is that, as Jan emphasized very well, there will be a reinforced role
of collective bargaining. Obviously, collective bargaining is a genuinely local thing
because what is appropriate in terms of remuneration will have to be determined at
a local level and in accordance with rules, as Ted said, that are likely to diverge
from member state to member state. I’m speaking from Dublin, and I represent
Trinity College Dublin. For Ireland, this approach is shocking, obviously.
Legislation that is being prepared is totally alien to the tradition of common law
countries, and Ireland is — they don’t have anything comparable to what Germany,
France, and Italy have.
What is being mandated, as Jan said, is a sort of infrastructure where
collective rights managers in each single sector will be the protagonist of this price
or tariff setting mechanism on a sector-by-sector basis. I believe that the most
interesting implementations will come also from the bigger picture of platform
regulation that I referred to.
I would say the complexities that we will have at the national level will be
mitigated by the activity of the Court of Justice, as Eleonora said. The Court will
help define concepts that, for now, are rather abstract. It seems obvious to me that,
in spite of the Directive provisions, we won’t have the same kind and level of
remuneration, for example, in Bulgaria or Romania and in Denmark or Ireland,
because licensing fees will have to be adapted also to the economic value of a
certain work, especially online, and to consumers’ willingness to pay. I believe that
especially non-European observers should pay attention to possible amendments to
the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, because it’s where these
abstract principles of fairness and transparency will become concretely enforceable.
TED SHAPIRO: Giuseppe, we’ve used up the time for this. I'm just
conscious that Jan and I have both pointed out some of the downsides. Silke, I'll
give you 30 seconds to say something about what you think about this, if you want
to quickly comment on the extent to which you believe that Articles 18 to 23 can
work beneficially across the member States.
SILKE VON LEWINSKI: Well, Jan has already pointed out the experience
we have had in Germany. I think, in essence, authors often don’t really have the
12
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possibility to negotiate good conditions unless they can do so collectively in one or
the other way, such as for example under German law by setting certain standards,
on what is an equitable remuneration. However, implementing rules in some
member states may be not very effective, especially where they do not show an
element of collectivity. In Germany, Articles 18 to 23 may improve some things a
little bit, but they are not the big breakthrough there.
TED SHAPIRO: Thank you very much. We’re now going to move to the
— I see there’s one question in the chat. Jan, I've got one quick question for you
that says, would it be possible to insulate lump sum payments applying globally?
If challenged in the EU, the global lump sum shall be cut from 100K to 50K or
10K, like a set-off? Great question, which poses a million complexities.
JAN NORDEMANN: I’ll do my very best. I think this is a “Yes.” If the
lump sum is for global use, you will have to distribute the lump sum per territory.
There’s quite extensive case law in Germany on how to distribute lump sums, not
only territory-wise but also timewise, different modes of use. This is indeed one of
these questions which are employment programs for lawyers.
TED SHAPIRO: You mentioned the issue of the international application
and the extent to which, for example, this could impact contracts between US
producers and US authors, which raises a whole number of complex issues. I even
wonder about companies that distribute and produce across the entire EU, how they
figure out which laws are applicable to which things. That’s going to be complex,
but okay, we'll have to move on from author/performer remuneration to our next
speaker who is Jerker Rydén. He is going to talk about his absolute favorite thing
that he talks about every year, except for last year, but of course he couldn’t, and
that is on extended collective licensing, the panacea for the world’s ills. Jerker, the
floor is yours.
JERKER RYDÉN: Well, thank you very much Ted. Due to some technical
problem, I don’t have access to my slides. I am so sorry for that.
The backdrop to Article 15 could be described as a crossroad of different
kinds of legislation. Ultimately, I think it about the fourth pillar of democracy: the
sustainability of a free and an independent news media. It’s been under heavy
pressure from these big tech giants, and the bottom line is the advertisement
business. Google, Facebook etc. have been very much damaging to the business
model of press publishers.
What the commission has recognized is the need to provide news media
corporations with a related right so they can effectively benefit from the reuse of
news media, which is taking place on these platforms. The aim is not to protect
works; it’s like the protection of a database or a catalog. The purpose of Article 15
is to protect the investment made by news media corporations. Will that make the
day? Well, that is yet to be seen.
Article 15 provides news media with a two-year protection and they have
to share the revenue they receive with authors. Obviously, it is ultimately about
how to recoup the investment protected by Article 15. The key is to find the efficient
way to recoup the investment. I would say, it’s a combination of how you make this
work, i.e., efficient collective licensing, and also find a way to share the revenue
with authors.
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Authors and press publishers do sit in the same boat. What is required is an
ecosystem consisting of the related right (Article 15) and efficient collective
licensing. Possibly, it could also relate to the new transparency rules.
As far as sharing the revenue, press publishers are faced with a challenge –
to establish a business model underpinned by the press publishers right and a
requirement to share the revenue with the authors (Article 15). I assume, to be able
to approach this effectively press publishers will have to work together with the
authors. Otherwise, they will be in a relatively weak position in relation to the
platforms. Press publishers themselves need to work collectively, and jointly with
authors, to gain leverage in negotiations with platforms. Extended Collective
Licensing (ECL) - Article 12 of the DSM Directive 13 - provide the mechanism for
such a business model. The reason I mentioned ECL is that collective licensing is
the only way forward to manage the rights and also to provide legal certainty, which
platforms will demand to enter into a license agreement.
In the Nordic countries CMOs represents not only authors, but also press
publishers. By approaching platforms through a CMO press publishers could
benefit from an existing organization i.e., no need to set up a CMO on their own.
Another advantage with the CMO is that press publishers and authors could use the
CMO as a forum to discuss and negotiate a viable business model.
ECL could play a role two ways. First of all, it's a streamlined, one-stopshop, and secondly it provides legal certainty, which I think would be attractive to
Facebook and Google and other platforms.
One thing, obviously, is that in some cases, the market value of the press
publishers’ right, could also be related to cross border use. Article 12 says that the
extended effect of the ECL is confined to the territory of the member state, but as
described in the opinion published by ALAI14 in 2016 and as I have provided
practical evidence of in ECL pilots with Finland and Malawi, ECL can be used
across borders.
At the end of the day, will Article 15 be a game-changer? Will it change the
market for advertisement? Will press publishers be able to compete with these big
tech giants and attract more advertisement? The answer is probably no. I believe
the overall effect on that marketplace for advertisement will be zero, but with
efficient licensing mechanisms press publishers could work collectively and jointly
with authors and create an ecosystem which will enable them to recoup their
investments.
Another point that I think is relevant to mention is that Article 12 (ECL),
which is not mandatory for Member States to transpose, could actually be
transposed by many more Member States because ECL is needed for press
publishers to recoup their investment. ECL is required to fill out what is missing in
Article 15, i.e., a viable collective licensing mechanism providing legal certainty
for mass use. And this is true for other articles in the DSM Directive as well Articles 3, 4, 5 and 17 - which in some instances require an ECL Article 3 and 4
require the user to have lawful access to works. In some instances, lawful access
may be provided under an exception or limitation, but in some instances it may not
13
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and a license is needed, and in many cases an ECL. The same argument can be
made for Article 17. I understand this is an ongoing discussion among CMOs and
some have an ambition to provide a solution to enable these articles to function as
intended.
ECL is not a panacea, not to be “prescribed” for any and all needs for a
license, but only for certain cases. And I would like to stress that ECL is about right
holders collectively opting into the contract in the first place. A contract is required
and all categories of rights holders concerned to opt-in. The ECL agreements I have
negotiated on the behalf of the National Library of Sweden have as parties all
categories of right holders concerned. Since they opt-in, they take an active part in
the agreement.
I think overall one can see ECL as the means for all right holders concerned
to be adequately remunerated and the means to establish viable business models for
mass use, and in respect to Article 15, to enable press publishers to recoup their
investments, authors to be compensated and platforms legal certainty.
I think I’m now within the time limit. Thank you for listening and finally, great to
see you all, unfortunately, not the ones in the audience, only the colleagues, but
nevertheless, great to see you. Thank you.
TED SHAPIRO: Thank you very much Jerker. It’s the perennial argument
over ECL. I always understood it as opt-out. Article 12 refers to opt-out not opt-in.
The difficulty with applying Article 12 to Article 17 is, of course, Article 17 may
have more of a cross-border nature, whereas Article 12 is limited to member state
territories, but certainly there has to be a role for extended collective licensing and
servicing exceptions. I believe it would be a disaster if it applied in the area of
Article 17.
Let’s stay on Article 15 and the implementation of Article 15 and the press
publishers’ right. Eleonora referred to the competition law push that was given to
get things going in France. I’ve been wondering about the flip side of it: what
happens if four or five big publishers sit in a room and pool their rights; whether
there’s an antitrust issue on that side. But let’s compare Article 15 and the way that
it’s being dealt with in Europe to the experience Down Under. Fiona, can you tell
us a little bit about what’s going on? There’s been a fair amount of this in the
European and American press. Tell us a little bit about how you see this contrasting
to what’s been going on in Australia.
FIONA PHILLIPS: Thanks Ted. What’s happening is actually interesting
in the sense that we actually in Australia have a very extensive use of copyright
licensing and have our very own statutory licensing regime, but that is not the
approach that has been taken with press publishers. I think that the approach in
Australia has some pluses and minuses. One is, actually, that some deals have
actually in the last month been done between Google and Facebook and some major
media players, but there are also some downsides.
Just to give some context, people will have seen that Australia recently had
its access to news via Facebook switched off, without any warning, and it happened
to coincide with the week that vaccines were beginning to be rolled out here. For
example, the Australian Medical Association’s Facebook site suddenly
disappeared. The background to our approach is that this issue is being looked at
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from a competition perspective. I spoke at the conference a couple of years ago
about our competition regulator’s inquiry into digital platforms. That inquiry
actually came through a political process.
The lens of inquiry really was just about Google and Facebook and the
impact on public interest news, on journalism, and the advertising market that went
along with that. One of the many recommendations that came out of the inquiry
was the establishment of a media bargaining code. They tried to do it voluntarily.
Then when it was clear that that wasn’t going anywhere, the Government
announced that it was planning to decree a mandatory bargaining code. As you will
have seen, both Google and Facebook threatened to withdraw from the market. In
the end, the legislation has passed and deals have been done, but I think there are a
couple of issues that are worth noting.
One is, because it’s political and it comes from a competition perspective,
the focus is just on Google and Facebook. It’s not looking holistically at digital
platforms. The second thing is that the code applies to media businesses. They have
to hit a certain economic threshold of about $150,000 per annum, just from news
content to be captured. Query who will be in and who will not have access at this
stage. Preemptively, Google and Facebook have entered into deals with some of
the major players, for example, NewsCorp and some of the major broadcasters.
Thirdly, and I think from a copyright perspective one of the things that is
troubling is that there’s no mechanism to remunerate the underlying rights-holders
in that news content.
In summary, there are some pluses in that, because there is this threat of
actually being forced to go to arbitration, there is a large stick to be applied, which
has had some effect, but there are some limitations in terms of the coverage dealing
holistically with digital platforms with news content and with remunerating
creators.
TED SHAPIRO: Thanks, Fiona. It starts to sound like you need a
combination of copyright and competition law, a little bit along the lines of what
was happening in France.
Meanwhile in the Q&A, questions came and got answered. A question came
up about whether the German implementation that Silke referred to, based on the
sui generis nature, was compliant with the Directive. Eleonora answered that she
did not think it was. Jan seconded her motion, and Giuseppe wants to praise Article
17 for having made the Polish government act as a human rights advocate. I do find
it pretty ironic that the case in defense of certain fundamental rights, or at least
purportedly in defense of certain fundamental rights, was brought by the semitotalitarian regime, but that’s where we are.
We still have some more time for questions. If anyone has one in the
audience — We have seven minutes left.
JAN NORDEMANN: A quick remark on Article 15, the related right of
press publishers. There are also some German experiences with this because we
had such related right before it got annulled by the CJEU some years ago. There
may be an antitrust issue because Google in Germany tried to evade and avoid this
related exclusive right by forcing the publishers into non-paid licenses. That’s what
happened in France as well. That’s something the DSM Directive doesn't address.
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I just wanted to point out that you may need the help of competition law (antitrust
law), in order to put this into place against the really big ones, i.e., in particular
Google.
TED SHAPIRO: Would you have expected the DSM Copyright Directive
to address this issue?
JAN NORDEMANN: Well, you could address this under copyright law, if
you would just choose to only allow mandatory collective licensing. Then the issue
goes away, but of course, there are good reasons that the DSM Directive did not do
this and leaves that to individual licensing in the end. Of course, with the option to
run it, as Jerker had said, through ECL, or whatever other licensing scheme, but
there may be the issue of Google’s request for non-paid licenses — I don't know if
the fight is over because Google and France have settled the competition law case,
but at least you probably need to expect some more cases.
That said, just maybe to give a little more detail, it may be an abuse of a
dominant position in that case a dominant search engine like Google, with a threat
of listing light the press publishers, as we call it in Germany, or even delisting them,
at least to a limited extent, that forces them into non-paid licenses. That’s the issue,
that may be an abuse of a dominant position. That’s something that needs to be
addressed before this starts to work, this related right.
TED SHAPIRO: Yes, we see this trend that there’s a combination between
copyright and competition law to deal with this issue. I guess it’s disturbing to me
that the answer has to be mandatory collective licensing because I don’t see how
that incentivizes folks to invest in content. I saw Silke, when you were raising your
hand, I think you wanted to make a comment on this point.
SILKE VON LEWINSKI: Thank you. Just to follow up on Jan. Yes, it
seems you cannot always rely on antitrust authorities or on existing competition
law. While I agree with the French one, which found that, in this case, Google’s
behavior was likely to be an abuse of a dominant position, the German cartel office
— the authority for antitrust law — did not find sufficient evidence of abuse of a
dominant position towards the German publishers from whom Google did not want
to acquire remunerated licenses.
I would agree that, in such situations where you have an internet giant on
one hand, and rights-owners who have an exclusive right but do not get the option
to grant a remunerated license under an agreement on the other, there is a problem
related to a dominant position. Copyright alone does not help you in this situation.
You need, in addition, suitable competition rules and authorities in order to
rebalance the bargaining power between the two parties.
TED SHAPIRO: Well, I guess we have a bit of a consensus in this area.
We’re running out of time so what I would like to do is to flip again, quickly to
Article 17. We have the pending Polish case, and we know that the Advocate
General’s opinion is coming out on 15 July. We all know what he’s going to say
because he already wrote the decision for YouTube, so we know. Let’s skip over
the Advocate General and pretend that he’s a candle in the wind. Quick predictions
on what the outcome will be from the Court of Justice in the Poland versus EU case.
Eleonora, you go first.
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ELEONORA ROSATI: My bet is that the court will say that Article 17 is
valid, but if I can add another prediction, I don’t think that the Court of Justice will
say anything in YouTube/Uploaded.
TED SHAPIRO: Okay, Jan. Your turn.
JAN NORDEMANN: My guess is also that it will stand. Article 17 will
stand, but the court will again re-emphasize that you need to balance all the rights
involved.
TED SHAPIRO: Surprising to me that no one is pointing out what the
Commission said. Silke?
SILKE VON LEWINSKI: I’d rather say that my hope is that it will decide
that Article 17 stands because that’s what I think the law is. I do not see any
infringement of fundamental rights. They have been balanced quite well in the text
of Article 17, but you never know what the Court of Justice will hold.
TED SHAPIRO: Our time is up. Giuseppe, real quick.
GIUSEPPE MAZZIOTTI: I think that Poland will be unsuccessful at the
very end and, if I can add a very quick remark, I think the regulations the EU is
likely to pass, i.e. the DMA and DSA, will help resolve the competition concerns
that you referred to regarding news publishers. It’s clear to me that those rights and
infrastructural changes in the way platforms are organized might protect or restore
competition, if and when they enter into force.
TED SHAPIRO: Jerker, any final comment? Do you have a prediction on
the Polish case?
JERKER RYDÉN: It’s not really my area of practice at all. I was asked to
talk about press publishers because I have experience of negotiating public private
partnerships with press publishers in which context ECL played an instrumental
role to enable the collaboration between the parties and facilitate the massdigitizing of newspapers in the library´s collection and enable both parties to make
use of the result based on ECL-agreements. I think that Article 15 is a very niche
solution, very narrow. The conclusion is that, if it’s going to be applied based on
ECL, that it could be a wake-up call for some member states that ECL could be
used for special cases when you cannot solve it otherwise.
As I mentioned ECL could be required in respect of Article 3, 4, 5 and 17
in certain cases, and cross-border use is possible as described in the opinion on ECL
published by ALAI and as I have provided evidence of in ECL-pilots. ECL
shouldn’t be in an EU regulation. There’s no one-size-fits-all solution. ECL in my
view has to develop gradually, organically, in the member states in respect of their
legal traditions, and what they are accustomed to.
TED SHAPIRO: Okay, thank you very much. Let’s keep it niche. Finally,
Fiona. Obviously, you’re not an expert on Article 17, but what do you think about
it vis a vis Australia?
FIONA PHILLIPS: What do I think about it? Well, I think Article 17 is a
really interesting option and would be far preferable to what we have. I won’t offer
a prediction for what the CJEU is going to say, but I would hope it would uphold
the validity of the Article.
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TED SHAPIRO: Okay, thank you. There you have it, folks. I’ve consulted
the future and it remains only to wish you all peace, love, and copyright, and
hopefully see you next year in New York City.
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